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ABSTRACT
This Note argues that the United States courts have jurisdiction to consider corporate liability for
international law violations of human rights under the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada,
in Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya. The United States Supreme Court has escaped holding such
liability exists, but Canada has outlined how countries, such as the United States, no longer can
avoid holding corporations liable under customary international law. Corporate liability for human
rights violations committed abroad is a cutting-edge issue. The United States Supreme Court has
considered the issue before, but the Court used different analyses and was without any precedent
to refer to. In prior decisions, the Court rationalized that customary international law was not
influential enough and that Congress needed to be involved to hold corporations liable for such
violations. However, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision demonstrates that the United States’
justices who previously decided against adoption of corporate liability under customary
international law no longer can defend their antiquated arguments. This issue is bound to be in
front of the Court again and will be highly publicized because of the trending rise of importance
of human rights. The United States Supreme Court must conform to the customary international
law holding corporations liable for international law violations of human rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Workers rolled in hot sand and were beaten until unconscious. Workers laid on the

ground with their limbs tied up, so their skin burned in the blazing sun. Workers were confined
to camps. Workers being treated inhumanely is not a thing of the past.
The concept of human rights has been present for centuries, and consequently, human
rights violations have occurred for centuries as well.1 The end of slavery in the nineteenth
century and the liberation of Nazi Camps, in addition to the end of World War II in the midtwentieth century, were significant turning points that changed human rights.2 Today, people
universally recognize the significance of these events because they helped establish equality,
fairness, and health amongst persons.3
As time goes on, people and their respective governments are becoming less accepting of
human rights violations that occur in and out of their countries.4 However, corporations,
particularly those that are multinational, presently are not legally bound to practice basic human
rights.5 Instead, they threaten, beat, tie up, overwork, underpay, and confine individuals to ensure
1

See SAMANTHA POWER & GRAHAM ALLISON, REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT,
5-6 (Palgrave Macmillan 2000).
2

Id. at 8-9.

3

Emmanuelle Jouannet, What is the Use of International Law?, in 1 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Hélène Ruiz-Fabri et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
4

See Max Rosner, Human Rights, OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/human-rights (last visited Nov.
24, 2020).

5

See Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: Controversial but necessary, Business &
Human Rights Resource Centre, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/corporate-human-rights-obligationscontroversial-but-necessary/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2020); see also David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to
Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
931, 947 (2004). See generally Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018).
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high work efficacy.6 Disturbingly, these corporations have not been held civilly liable for such
tortious acts.7
Not all countries take the same stance on human rights.8 The United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom all have similar human rights standards,9 yet none allowed corporations in
their respective countries to be held liable for international law violations prior to 2019.10 The
United States continues to place barriers which stop victims of these atrocious acts from bringing
their claims,11 but Canada and the United Kingdom have finally decided that victims deserve to
have their day in court and possibly be granted compensation for being treated inhumanely.12
In February 2020, the Supreme Court of Canada made a landmark judgment by deciding
that corporations incorporated in Canada may be held liable for customary international law
violations, even if committed abroad.13 The closely divided decision in Nevsun Resources Ltd. v.
Araya (hereinafter “Nevsun”) determined liability could exist through the doctrine of adoption of
6

See Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, para. 11-12 (Can.); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.
108, 113 (2013).

7

See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1408; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124.

8

Onyi Lam & Drew DeSilver, Countries have different priorities when they review each other’s human rights
records, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/20/countrieshave-different-priorities-when-they-review-each-others-human-rights-records/.

9

Compare U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (Mar. 11, 2020) (reporting the U.S. government is cooperative and responsive to human rights groups
views and penalizes for many human rights violations), with U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and
Lab., 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Kingdom (reporting the United Kingdom
government is also cooperative and responsive to human rights groups views and penalizes for many human rights
violations), and U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Canada (reporting the Canadian government is particularly cooperative and responsive to human rights
groups views and penalizes for many human rights violations).
10

See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403; Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 122.

11

See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).

12
See Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 11-12; Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, para. 60-62 (appeal
taken from England).
13

Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 132.
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customary international law because no conflicting law is in place and there is no tenable reason
for refuting corporate liability.14 Canada joined a minority, but rapidly increasing number of
countries, to set such precedent and take a stand against human rights violations.
While the Nevsun opinion was being written, the United Kingdom determined that tort
liability existed for corporations in international actions of human rights violations.15 Although
the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s approach was different due to the nature of the claims,
both the United Kingdom and Canada believe a duty of care is owed to persons that work for
parent companies that are located in the worker’s country.16 In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court in their recent decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC (hereinafter “Jesner”)
agreed, in part, with the dissenting judges in Nevsun.17 They both held that because corporations
have never been legally liable to such tortious acts, they should not be held liable until and unless
the legislature dictates they should be.18
This Note argues that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya,
was correct in concluding it has jurisdiction to hear a case concerning corporate liability for
international law violations of human rights, and, therefore, the United States Supreme Court
does as well. Part II of this Note addresses the history of customary international law (CIL), the
doctrine of adoption of customary international law, the act of state doctrine, and recent cases
involving corporate liability for international tortious acts. Part III addresses how customary
international law enables courts to allow for corporate liability, why the decision can be a judge14

Id.

15

Vedanta, [2019] UKSC 20 at para. 60-62.

16

Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 11-12; Vedanta, [2019] UKSC 20 at para. 60-62.

17

Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018).

18

Id.; Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 132.
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made decision and not a legislative act, and why there would not be foreign relations issues nor
economic and policy issues when courts find jurisdiction to hear a case concerning corporate
liability for international law violations. Part IV concludes.
II.

BACKGROUND
Customary international law refers to legal norms that arise from international practices.19

Customary international law enables courts to hold corporations liable for international law
violations of human rights.20 To understand the authority of international law and the courts, two
things must be considered. First, one must consider the historical and current implications of
doctrinal law. Second, one must consider the implications of case law. This section analyzes both
with respect to Canada and the United States.
A. Historical and Current Implications of Doctrinal Law
The act of state doctrine provides that a national court is unable to adjudicate cases
regarding the lawfulness of the sovereign acts of a foreign state.21 The framework of the doctrine
can be found in old English cases.22 Since its early application, the English doctrine has
developed. The court in Yukos Capital SARL v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co. pointed out limitations and
exceptions; one being that “the doctrine will not apply to foreign acts of state which are in breach
of clearly established rules of international law, or are contrary to English principles of public
19

Connie de la Vega, Customary International Law, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 451 (David P. Forsythe
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009).

20

See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (June 26, 1945).

21

R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL), [269] (appeal taken
from England).

22

See Blad v. Bamfield (1674), 36 Eng. Rep. 992; Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1848), 49 Eng. Rep.
724.
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policy, as well as where there is grave infringement on human rights.”23 The English courts, as
well as Australian courts, struggle to apply the doctrine because it was created in an earlier era
and is largely defined by limitations.24
Canadian law, although rooted in English law, has incorporated similar principles of the
act of state doctrine into its law instead of upholding the doctrine. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v.
Hammer demonstrates the two principles that Canadian law has adopted.25 The first principle is
referred to as the conflict of laws.26 This is the general principle that “no state will apply a law of
another which offends against some fundamental morality or public policy.”27 The second
principle is judicial restraint.28 This is the principle that courts will refrain from making
conclusions which appear to legally bind foreign states.29
The doctrine of adoption of customary international law, (hereinafter “doctrine of
adoption”) also known as the English doctrine of incorporation, is the principle “that customary
rules are to be considered part of the law of the land and enforced as such, with the qualification
that they are incorporated only so far as is not inconsistent with the Acts of Parliament or prior
judicial decisions of prior authority.”30 If not inconsistent, the country adopts and upholds the
law as its own. This doctrine of automatic judicial incorporation has been recognized for
23

[2012] EWCA (Civ) 855 [69] (Eng.).

24

Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 132 (citing Habib v. Australia, [2010] 183 FCR 62, para. 51 (Austl.)).

25

Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1982] AC 888 [931-32] (Eng.).

26

Id.

27

Laane v. Estonian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line, [1949] S.C.R. 530, 545 (Can.). This simply means that a
state will not adopt a law of another state if it is against its fundamental morality or public policy.
28

Buttes, [1982] AC 888 at 931-32.

29

Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, para. 47 (Can.).

30

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (7th ed. Oxford Univ. Press, 2008).

64

VOL. 10 (2022)

centuries in Canada and was most recently confirmed in R. v. Hape.31 Justice LeBel, in Hape,
held that “the court may look to prohibitive rules of customary international law to aid in the
interpretation of Canadian law and the development of the common law.”32
Customary international law is integrated into transcribed law.33 An authoritative source
of international law and customary international law is the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.34 The statute accepts the application of international custom, as evidenced by general
practice, international conventions, whether general or particular, and the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.35
There are two requirements for a customary international law to be recognized by
Canada: (1) be general practice and (2) be opinio juris.36 To be general, the practice must be
sufficiently widespread, representative, and consistent.37 To be opinio juris (“opinion of the
law”), the practice must be “undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation.”38 Opinio juris
is “distinguish[able] from mere usage or habit.”39
31

R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, para. 39 (Can.).

32

Id.

33

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (June 26, 1945).

34
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (June 26, 1945) (“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; and (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law . . . .”).
35

Id.

36

See North Sea Cont’l Shelf (Ger. V. Den.; Ger. V. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶71 (Feb. 20); Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventy-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 120 (2018).

37

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventy-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 120 (2018).

38

Id.

39

Id.; see generally North Sea Cont’l Shelf (Ger. V. Den.; Ger. V. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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It is important to recognize that within customary international law there are preemptory

norms, also known as jus cogens, which Canada recognizes as a “fundamental tenant of
international law that is non-derogable.”40 Jus cogens is “a norm that enjoy a higher rank in the
international hierarchy than treaty law and even ordinary customary rules.”41 Two universally
accepted jus cogens norms are prohibitions on torture42 and slavery.43 The legal liability imposed
on those that break jus cogens norms do vary based on other laws states have.44
Customary international laws become integrated in Canadian law through the doctrine of
adoption.45 The United States, however, adopts customary international law through judicial
application without the intervention of Congress.46 The modern view, as provided by the
Restatement, is that “customary international law in the United States is federal law and its
determination by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”47 Section 102 of Restatement
(Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations Law of the United States reiterates this notion.48 The
40

Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176, para. 47 (Can.) (citing JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 2008)). Non-derogable rights are “legal rights that must be fully honored” (not taken
away or compromised). Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
41
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14,
1999).
42

Kazemi, 3 S.C.R. at para. 152.

43

David Weissbrodt & Anti-Slavery International, Office of U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Abolishing
Slavery and its Contemporary Forms, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/02/4, ¶6 (2002).
44

Kazemi, 3 S.C.R. 176, para. 60 (holding that the jus cogens norm of prohibitions on torture cannot create liability
and redress on foreign officials due the State Immunity Act).

45

Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, para. 86-87 (Can.).

46

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964)).
47

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 note 3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
48

Id. § 102 (“(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international community of
states (a) in the form of customary law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles
common to the major legal systems of the world. (2) Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation. (3) International agreements create
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Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain affirmed that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) allows the
acceptance of customary international law.49 The Alien Tort Statute provides: “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”50
B. Implications of Case Law
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected corporate liability for
international law violations.51 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court held that
Nigerian nationals could not obtain relief from corporations for violations of customary
international law that occur outside the United States because the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to claims under the Alien Tort Statute.52 Most recently, the Court
rejected corporate liability in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, where the defendant allegedly supported
international terrorism by financing suicide bombings in Israel through its New York branch and
making martyrdom payments to the families of deceased bombers. 53 The Court held that because
corporations have never been legally liable to tortious acts committed abroad, they should not be

law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when such agreements
are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted. (4) General principles common to the
major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement, may be
invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.”).
49
542 U.S. at 727. The court stated the limitations considered when adopting customary international law is whether
“a claimant has exhausted any remedies available (1) in the United States legal system; and (2) perhaps, in other
fora, such as international claims tribunals.” Id.
50

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1940). The law of nations is the same notion as customary international law.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013) (evading the question of whether corporations
could be held liable for tortious act when “all relevant conduct took place outside of the United States.”); Sosa, 542
U.S. at 725 (holding that the Court in narrow circumstances may recognize a common-law cause of action for
present-day law of nations, and corporate liability for international tort law violations is not one).

51

52

569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013). The court also stated that the Alien Tort Statute permits only three claims: violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Id. at 119.

53

138 S. Ct. 1386, 1393-94 (2018).
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liable unless the legislature ultimately says so.54 Also, the Court reasoned that courts cannot hold
corporations liable for violations of customary international law because of the Alien Tort
Statute.55 The Court agreed with a circuit court’s preceding interpretation of the statue to apply
only to natural persons and thus not corporations.56
The Supreme Court of Canada, prior to 2020, also did not hold corporations liable for
international law violations. In Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the S.C.C.57 examined
whether a state could be held liable for damages when Iranian officials beat, sexually assaulted,
and tortured a Canadian citizen who eventually died because of her injuries.58 The S.C.C. was
unable to give the right to remedy because “the peremptory norm prohibiting torture has not yet
created an exception to state immunity from civil liabilities in cases of torture committed
abroad.”59
The S.C.C. recently in Nevsun was able to distinguish its holding from Kazemi because
the defendant was not a state, but a corporation.60 Nevsun Resources Ltd., a Canadian mining
company based in British Columbia, owns a 60% interest in Bisha Mining Share Company which
operates the Bisha mine in Eritrea.61 In Nevsun, refugees from Eritrea claimed that Nevsun
54

Id. at 1403.

55

Id. at 1407.

56

Id. at 1395-96, 1407 (citing Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 134-37 (2d Cir. 2010)).

57

For the purposes of this Note, the Supreme Court of Canada may be referred to by the acronym “S.C.C.” when
referring to the Supreme Court of Canada to avoid confusing it with the opinions of the United States Supreme
Court.

58

[2014] 3 S.C.R. 176, para. 1391 (Can.).

59

Id. at para. 153 (finding that the State Immunity Act blocked the right to remedy) (emphasis added).

60

Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, para. 121-22 (Can.).

61

Id. at para. 7.
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Resources had been complicit in breaches of international human rights law.62 These breaches
included forced labor; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against
humanity by the Eritrean government through its subsidiary, Bisha.63
Nevsun Resources brought a motion to strike the pleadings pursuant to the act of state
doctrine and proposed that the customary international law claims should be struck for having no
responsible prospect of success.64 Both the trial and appellate judges denied Nevsun Resources’
motions.65 The lower courts found that there were no grounds asserted by Nevsun Resources in
which the Eritrean workers’ claims should be struck based on breaches of customary
international law.66
The Supreme Court of Canada then examined two questions on appeal: (1) whether the
act of state doctrine formed part of Canadian common law, and (2) whether customary
international law prohibitions against forced labor; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment; and crimes against humanity grounded a claim for damages under Canadian law?67
The majority, by a 5-4 decision, held that the act of state doctrine did not make the claim nonjusticiable because the doctrine was not ratified by Canadian jurisprudence and because the
doctrine’s underlying principles of conflict of laws and judicial restraint did not bar the Eritrean
worker’s claims.68 Justice Abella, writing for the majority and in response to the second
62

Id. at para. 4.

63

Id.

64

Id. at para. 5.

65

Id.

66

Id.at para. 20.

67

Id. at para. 26.

68

Id. at para. 57-59.
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question, held that “it is not plain and obvious to me that the Eritrean worker’s claims against
Nevsun based on breaches of customary international law cannot proceed.”69 Ultimately, the
majority reasoned the case should proceed to trial to determine whether the alleged breaches
were made and what remedies were appropriate.70 The reason being was that Canadian domestic
law recognizes customary international law vis-à-vis the doctrine of adoption, the claims were
based on jus cogens norms opposing forced labor, and customary international law is binding on
corporations.71
Two of the four dissenting justices, Brown and Rowe, agreed with the majority regarding
the dismissal of the act of state doctrine, but disagreed that customary international law allows
the workers to bring new tort claims in court.72 Brown and Rowe argued that “international law
cannot require Canadian law to take a certain direction, except inasmuch as Canadian law allows
it.”73 They, like the majority in Jesner,74 believed that “such a change [as presented in this case]
would require an act of a competent legislature. It does not fall within the competence of this
Court, or any other.”75 Brown and Rowe did believe that the proposed torts of slavery and forced
labor would pass their test of recognizing a new tort.76 However, they reverted back to broadly
concluding that the case was not the time to determine if such liability exists on corporations
69

Id. at para. 132.

70

Id. at para. 131.

71

Id. at para. 90, 95, 102.

72

Id. at para. 135-36 (Brown, Rowe J.J., dissenting).

73

Id. at para. 152.

74

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).

75

Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 153.

76

Id. at para. 247.
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because the executive branch and Parliament have the resources to respond to such issues, and
“hard cases make bad law.”77
The remaining two dissenting judges, Moldaver and Côté, agreed with Brown and Rowe
regarding their reasoning for objecting to the adoption of customary international law, but also
disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the act of state doctrine.78 Côté, writing on his and
Moldaver’s behalf, asserted that there is a second “branch” to the doctrine which was not
discussed by the majority: the non-justiciability branch.79 “The non-justiciability branch of
doctrine is concerned with judicial abstention from adjudicating upon the lawfulness of actions
of foreign states.”80 Côté determined that the case at issue required the S.C.C. to ascertain
whether Eritrea violated its obligations under international law; thus, this was not a case of
considering the legality of the acts of another state incidentally, but a non-justiciable case.81
While the Supreme Court of Canada was making its decision on Nevsun, the United
Kingdom Supreme Court82 set precedent for the state in April 2019 when the U.K.S.C.
unanimously held that a parent corporation can be held liable under civil law for human rights
violations and environmental harm caused by its foreign subsidiary.83 In the case, Konkola
Copper Mines (located in Zambia), owned mostly by Vedanta (a United Kingdom corporation),
allegedly released toxic materials into the local watercourses in Zambia, causing harm to locals’
77

Id. at para. 255-56.

78

Id. at para. 267.

79

Id. at para. 275-76.

80

Id. at para. 286 (referencing Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1982] AC 888, 931 (Eng.)).

81

Id. at para. 306-10.

82

For the purposes of this Note, the United Kingdom Supreme Court may be referred to by the acronym “U.K.S.C.”
in place of “Court” to avoid confusing it with the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.

83

Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, para. 60-62 (appeal taken from England).
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health and farming activities.84 Local Zambians sued under common law negligence and breach
of statutory duty.85 The United Kingdom Supreme Court held that “the liability of parent
companies in relation to the activities of their subsidiaries is not, of itself, a distinct category of
liability in common law negligence.”86 However, the U.K.S.C. noted there are circumstances in
which a parent company might have a duty of care to third parties harmed by its subsidiary
company, and it determined that this case was one of those circumstances.87 The U.K.S.C. noted
they could hear the case also because “there is a real risk that substantial justice will not be
obtainable in that foreign jurisdiction.”88 Ultimately this United Kingdom Supreme Court
decision is an example of how public principles against human rights violations can be
recognized by judicial action in domestic tort law. The same principle should apply in the United
States.
III.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS
The process of adopting customary international law through the courts is not simple and

is not something the courts take lightly. Deciding if customary international law mandates the
recognition of corporate liability for international law violations of human rights requires many
considerations. The S.C.C. analyzed whether customary law truly supported recognizing
84

Id. at para. 1-2.

85

Id. at para. 3.

86

Id. at para. 49.

87

Id. at para. 53-55. “Even where group-wide policies do not of themselves give rise to such a duty of care to third
parties, they may do so if the parent does not merely proclaim them, but takes active steps, by training, supervision
and enforcement, to see that they are implemented by relevant subsidiaries. Similarly, it seems to me that the parent
may incur the relevant responsibility to third parties if, in published materials, it holds itself out as exercising that
degree of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if it does not in fact do so.” Id. at 53.

88

Id. at para. 88 (referring to the possibility that Zambia’s court system may not give them a fair trial).
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corporate liability for international law violations, whether the court had the power to decide
such, and whether it was too risky to decide because of foreign relations, policy, and economic
issues.89 As discussed in this section, the S.C.C. correctly decided that customary international
law mandates such a finding, the Court had the power to decide such, and making the decision
was not too risky.90 The S.C.C.’s analysis thus permits the analysis of whether the United States
Supreme Court could do so as well; the following section establishes that the United States can
and should follow the precedent of Canada.
A. Customary International Law Supports Corporate Liability
It is generally uncontested that the Supreme Court of Canada has the authority to adopt
customary international laws categorized as jus cogens norms through the doctrine of adoption.91
It is also generally uncontested that the United States Supreme Court has the same authority
through traditional judicial application.92 Thus, so long as a customary international law is
proven to exist, both states have the authority to apply the law judicially.93 Although the majority
and two of the dissenting justices in Nevsun disagree on the application (or lack thereof) of the
act of state doctrine, for the purpose of this Note it is appropriately assumed that the majority was
correct in their analysis.94
89

Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, para. 50, 86, 94, 112-13 (Can.).

90

Id.
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Id. at para. 83-86.
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“[C]ourts [can] recognize private causes of action [under the
ATS] for certain torts in violation of the law of nation . . . .”). There is some debate whether the power really can be
used – this note takes the position that the courts have and thus can use the power, but are just hesitant to use it, as
explained in subsection B of this Note.
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Id.; Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 95-97.
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Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 57, 275-76.
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The Supreme Court of Canada did not err in finding that customary international law

supported the adoption of corporate liability for human rights violations committed abroad.95 The
dissenting justices in Nevsun96 and the United States Supreme Court were incorrect to assume
differently.97 The Supreme Court of Canada proved that there was a general practice and that the
practice was opinio juris, as required by common law; the Court sufficiently demonstrated such
customary international law existed by looking at various sources.98
Justice Abella’s first source was policies.99 More than 50 states, including Canada and the
United States, have adopted responsible business conduct (RBC) plans based off the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.100 A significant portion of these vital plans focuses on human
rights.101 In fact, the first line of the United States RBC is “[t]he United States is committed to
promoting human rights.”102 Many states have also openly supported the United Nations Guiding
95

Id.
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Id. at para. 265, 313.
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Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1410 (2018).
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Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 112-15.
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Id. at 115.
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OECD, About Responsible Business Conduct, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/about.htm (noting that the countries
that adopt such instruments include the largest markets in the world).
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See U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Commercial and Business Affairs, Responsible Business Conduct: First
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Conduct & Sector-Specific Guidance: Manual for Canada (2019).
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U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Commercial and Business Affairs, Responsible Business Conduct: First National
Action Plan for The United States of America, at 2 (2016), https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/265918.pdf.
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Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).103 The principles within are not binding on
a state; however, they suggest (1) states have a duty to protect human rights, (2) there is
“corporate responsibility to respect human rights,” and (3) states have an obligation to provide
plaintiffs access to remedies for human rights abuses by corporations.104
Policies such as RBCs and the UNGPs demonstrate that most states are unified in their
position that corporations no longer can disregard human rights and should be held to a certain
standard. These adopted policies further prove that human rights norms – jus cogens norms –
have indeed been present and recognized by both Canada and the United States for the past few
years. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized such policy as proof of unity in finding
corporate liability for international tortious violations.105 To the contrary, the United States has
not considered such, but yet strikingly believes “U.S. companies are among the global leaders in
RBC and are widely recognized for their commitment to promoting human rights [and]
respecting the rule of law.”106 Thus, as leaders and respecters of the law, the United States
judiciary should recognize corporate liability for tortious acts committed abroad against humans.
Justice Abella’s second source was academia.107 Many academic commentators believe
customary international law mandates that private actors, such as corporations, be held liable for
103

U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK, U.N. DOC. HR/PUB/11/04
(2011).

104

Id. at 1.
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Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, para. 115 (Can.).
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U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 102, at 4.
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Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 111-13.

75

VOL. 10 (2022)

tortious acts committed abroad for various reasons, but mostly in support of human rights.108
Professor Stephens insists that “[t]he context in which international human rights norms must be
interpreted and applied today is one in which such norms are routinely applied to private actors[]
[as] [h]uman rights law in the past several decades has moved decisively to prohibit violations by
private actors.”109 The S.C.C. in Nevsun agreed.110
Similarly to Professor Stephens, Professor Koh conceives that:
[T]he commonsense fact remains that if states and individuals can be held liable
under international law, then so too should corporations, for the simple reason that
both states and individuals act through corporations. Given that reality, what legal
sense would it make to let states and individuals immunize themselves from
liability for gross violations through the mere artifice of corporate formation?111
Professor Koh further reasons that non-state actors like corporations can be held
accountable for violations of international criminal law and thus concludes it would not “make
sense to argue that international law may impose criminal liability on corporations, but not civil
liability.”112 Justice Abella, in agreeance with academia, believed it was “not plain and obvious
that corporations today enjoy a blanket exclusion under customary international law from direct
liability for violations of obligatory, definable, and universal norms of international law or
indirect involvement in complicity offenses.” 113 Although not mentioned in Nevsun, it is
108

See Harold H. Koh, Separating Myth from Reality about Corp. Resp. Litig., 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 265 (2004);
Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
45, 73 (2002).
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Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 113 (quoting Koh, supra note 111, at 265, 267) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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important to note that no demand exists that “there be sufficient international consensus with
regard to the mechanisms of enforcing these [customary international law] norms.”114
The majority in Jesner,115 Kiobel,116 and the dissent in Nevsun all disagreed with Justice
Abella.117 The majority in Jesner believed that “customary international law does not generally
require corporate liability, so declining to create it under the Alien Tort Statute cannot give other
nations just cause for complaint against the United States.”118 However, the majority did not
offer an analysis for this conclusion; the majority focused more on the concept that the U.S.
could escape a complaint.119
In Kiobel, the majority agreed with the lower courts in deciding the Alien Tort Statute
does not require corporate liability because the law of nations is to be applied to only three
categories: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.120
The dissent in Jesner, however, emphatically disagreed because the First Congress explicitly
stated lawsuits could be brought under “the law of nations” so that the district courts could
develop the categories of allowable claims brought under customary international law.121 The
114
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1420 (2018) (referencing that Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004) did not say that such a consensus was necessary).
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Id. at 1419.
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dissent, in alliance with Justice Abella, stated that “the conclusion that corporations may be held
liable . . . for violations of the law of nations is not of recent vintage.”122
The dissenting justices in Nevsun did not agree with Justice Abella for a few reasons, but
primarily because they did not think that there was enough evidence that corporate liability for
tortious crimes committed abroad existed in customary international law.123 The dissent pointed
to a 2007 United Nation’s report which states that “preliminary research has not identified the
emergence of uniform and consistent state practice establishing corporate responsibilities under
customary international law.”124 Although it is possible that preliminary research completed by
the United Nations over ten years ago did not show the uniform existence of corporate liability
for tortious acts committed abroad, one must consider three things. First, this research was
merely preliminary research, not a completed, rigorous study. Second, the data when compared
to today may no longer be accurate because of its age. Third, the United Nations has made
significant strides since to show how crucial it is for corporations to acknowledge they owe a
duty to humans to not violate their rights – this is demonstrated through the 2011 UNGPs
(mentioned above).125
The strongest counterevidence the dissent believed existed is that there is no case law
holding corporations liable for such tortious acts committed abroad.126 While this was true when
122

Id. at 1426. The dissent points out how more than a 100 years ago, the Attorney General acknowledged that
corporations could be held liable under the Alien Tort Statute. Id. (citing Mexican Boundary – Diversion of the Rio
Grande, 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 250, 252 (1908)).
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the oral arguments were held and for some time after, this was not true when the opinion was
published. It was not true because the United Kingdom recently upheld corporate liability for
alike human rights violations and environmental harm.127 Albeit, the United Kingdom did not
explicitly state customary international law principles supported their decision that a United
Kingdom-incorporated parent company has a duty of care and is therefore liable to those
individuals affected by such negligence.128 The lower court, however, iterated that even though
currently no such duty in jurisprudence has been explicitly established, it does not bar such a
duty from being established by a court.129 Thus, the opinion of the United Kingdom Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court both believe corporations have a duty of care to persons without
the requirement that other states have adopted such rule because such human rights are required
by society.130
Although the United Kingdom had not made that case decision before the judgment was
rendered,131 the Court still had proof that more than 40 states hold corporations liable for
committing legal wrongs abroad.132 However, the liability is not civil, but criminal.133 States
holding corporations liable for criminal wrongs is relevant because it demonstrates that Justice
127

Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe, [2019] UKSC 20, para. 60-62 (appeal taken from England). This means that not
only England, but also Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland hold that such liability exists.
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Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC, [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [88] (stating that although “there had been no reported
case in which a parent company had been held to owe a duty of care to a person affected by the operation of a
subsidiary. That may be true, but it does not render such a claim unarguable. If it were otherwise, the law would
never change.”). The Supreme Court did not disagree with the appellate court’s statement. Vedanta, [2019] UKSC
20 at para. 60-62.
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Abella did not misconstrue the need to hold corporations civilly liable under customary
international law because it is clearly accepted that they can be held criminally liable.
Finally, it is important to note that “[i]nternational law not only percolates down from the
international to the domestic sphere, but … also bubbles up”134 and “for a state to adopt a
customary international law it need not be “perfectly widespread or consistent at all times.”135
Thus, one state must be the first to outright declare a legal remedy exists for tort liability on
corporations for harms committed abroad. Technically, the United Kingdom was that state,136
however, Canada followed and clearly declared that customary international law gave such
authority.137 The United States Supreme Court was mistaken to believe that customary
international law does not support civil liability on corporations for acts committed abroad,138 as
“recognizing the possibility of a remedy for the breach of norms already forming part of the
common law is such a necessary development.”139 The United States Supreme Court should
uphold customary international law of corporate liability for international tort violations when
the next case with such a claim arises.
B. Legislative Action Would Be Redundant Because of Vested Judicial Power
134
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Ubi jus, ibi remedium – where there is a right, there is a remedy.140 Victims of human

rights abuse deserve legal remedy for the harm caused against them through tortious acts. It is
established that slavery and forced labor strip individuals of their inherent rights, and such
treatment is not acceptable.141 Thus, the legislature does not need to explicitly define remedies
available to victims when customary international law enables states, particularly Canada and the
United States, to adopt such.142 Both Canada and the United States agree that the law of nations
has always been part of the common law and may be incorporated by judicial intervention so
long as no conflicting legislation exists.143
The Supreme Court of Canada in Nevsun was clear in its determination that neither
Parliament nor the executive branch needed to dissect and decide whether a civil suit could be
brought against a Canadian parent corporation whose subsidiary abroad allegedly violated
numerous human rights violations.144 The S.C.C. agreed with the following statement:
Unless [a] statute has intervened to restrict the range of judge-made law, the
common law enables the judges, when faced with a situation where a right
recognised by law is not adequately protected, either to extend existing principles
to cover the situation or to apply an existing remedy to redress the injustice. There
is here no novelty: but merely the application of the principle ubi jus ibi
remedium.145
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Overall, the Supreme Court of Canada relied mostly upon the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, art. 38; its Parliament’s lack of statute forbidding corporate liability; and the doctrine
of adoption in determining the legislature does not need to create an express statute for its
decision to be permissible.146
The United States, if it used the Alien Tort Statute in addition to the same three
justifications as Canada (with the equivalent swap of the doctrine of adoption for the traditional
judicial application without the intervention of Congress), could enforce corporate liability for
international law violations without legislation. However, the United States Supreme Court has
been wrong, again and again, in deciding that it is Congress, not the Court, who must make a
decision regarding corporate liability for international law violations.147 The Court each time
makes an excuse as to why it cannot make the decision, and thus points the duty towards the
legislature.148 In Jesner, the Court erroneously believed the Alien Tort Statute applied to only
individual persons and not corporations, although corporations are not disqualified explicitly in
the text.149 In Sosa, the Court erroneously believed the Alien Tort Statute applied only to old
English law regarding violations of safe conditions to aliens, interference with ambassadors, and
piracy.150 In Kiobel, the Court avoided the issue by holding that such an issue must concern the
146

Id. at 76, 94.

147
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U.S. with sufficient force.151 These decisions do not preclude the Court from overturning them in
the next applicable case.
The United States Supreme Court has an opportunity in the future to right its wrongs
without the intervention of the legislative or executive branch. The executive branch in briefs has
even supported overturning the Court’s previous decisions to allow liability to extend to
corporations.152 Although Congress has not made any commentary on this exact subject matter,
Congress is cognizant of its power to create law excluding corporate liability under its
Constitutional powers.153 Supreme Court justices have noted that if Congress wanted to protect
corporations or any other alike entity from civil suits for international law violations that it
would have clearly said so.154 Moreover, the First Congress authorized suit for violations based
on “the law of nations” and “treat[ies] of the United States155 which granted the federal courts
jurisdiction over such claims that “Congress did not understand to be static.”156 Therefore, the
judiciary would not violate the separation of powers in enforcing liability on corporations.
151
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Historically, the United States Supreme Court has made decisions that had potentially

serious repercussions.157 The Court, knowing Congress has the power to overturn its decision
with legislation, has made decisions that prioritize the interests of the Constitution and the
nation’s people.158 The trend would accordingly continue in affirming that plaintiffs may file
civil suits for international law violations made by corporations whose main entity is domiciled
in the United States. Usually, so long as judicial law-making “move[s] the law a little further
along a line on which it is already moving, or to adapt it to accord with modern views and
practices,” then the judiciary has not overstepped their bounds.159 Some scholars and justices
believe holding corporations liable for tortious violations abroad is not the legal next step for the
judiciary, and thus for the legislature to decide.160
If it is not the next move, then what is? Human rights violations have been held as an
illegal practice for many years, and for years individuals have been able to hold others liable for
such violations.161 Thus, the next natural step is holding corporations liable for such heinous acts,
as “[t]he rapid emergence of human rights signifie[s] a revolutionary shift in international law,
from a state-centric to a human-centric conception of global order.”162
157
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See generally U.S. CONST. amends IX, XIV; Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1766); and Universal
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Asking the Court to reevaluate its previous decisions is not absurd because the judiciary

has the power to apply customary international law without interfering with the separation of
powers.163 Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court applied customary
international law without Congress; thus, the proposition that the Supreme Court can and is
obligated to apply customary international law now is not a new theory.164 As discussed
previously in Section A, the law allows for such adoption here.165 As Justice LeBel wrote years
after his decision in R. v. Hape, “norm[s] . . . must be followed by courts absent legislation which
clearly overrules them.166
C. Judicial Action that Creates Corporate Liability Is Not Too Risky
There are two main arguments made by opponents that do not believe the judiciary
should impose liability on corporations for international tort law violations, even if customary
international law demonstrates it should be. First, opponents stress that judicial action will cause
foreign relation issues with other states.167 The majority in Jesner believed that if they were to
act in favor of imposing corporate liability then it would “discourage[] American corporations
from investing abroad, including in developing economies where the host government might
have a history of alleged human-rights violations, or where judicial systems might lack the
163
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safeguards of the United States courts.”168 The majority also believed it “might deter the active
corporate investment that contributes to the economic development that so often is an essential
foundation for human rights.”169 These policy arguments are contrary to numerous human rights
treaties and conventions.170
The treaty proposed at a 1955 United Nations convention focusing on human rights
explicitly posited that there would be a “greater unity between its Members” because of the
pursuance of human rights.171 United Nations members also conceded in a 2007 treaty that
“[m]arkets function efficiently and sustainably only when certain institutional parameters are in
place . . . [including] the curtail[ment] [of] individual and social harms imposed by markets.
History demonstrates that without adequate institutional underpinning, markets will fail to
deliver their full benefits.”172 Also, states appreciate “the importance of maintaining and
strengthening international peace founded upon freedom, equality, justice and respect for
fundamental human rights and of developing friendly relations among nations irrespective of
their political, economic and social systems or the levels of their development.”173
It, therefore, has been long established that supporting human rights and upholding
international tort violations against corporations is part of the foundation of markets and states.
So, although the argument is made that corporate investment might be deterred, and
168
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consequently affect other states’ economies, the larger risk is ignoring human rights because they
are the legal infrastructure of states regardless of their status.174 Contrary to the majority of the
United States Supreme Court in Jesner,175 the Supreme Court of Canada in Nevsun appropriately
confirmed that “the deference accorded by comity to foreign legal systems ‘ends where clear
violations of international law and fundamental human rights begins.’”176
Second, opponents that do not support imposing liability on corporations for international
tort law violations stress that the “court may not be in a position to appreciate the economic and
policy issues underlying the choice”177 because “[g]overnment departments have the resources to
study and evaluate policy options [and] [t]he legislative process . . . consider[s] . . . competing
viewpoints.”178 But as Judge John Marshall opined, “[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”179 Thus, it is within a Supreme Court’s reach to
determine that a jus cogens norm is a law, which is customary, and therefore, judicially
enforceable without the advice of the executive or legislative branch in the United States or
Canada. Here, courts are not examining facts which, admittedly, sometimes require resources to
evaluate; the courts here are examining public international law, which is law, not fact.180
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International law “not only maintain[s] the peace between States, but [] protect[s] the

lives of individuals, their liberty, their health, [and] their education.”181 The majority in Jenser
believed that the judiciary allowing corporate liability for international tort violations for
impeding on human rights is a “no-win proposition,”182 but there is no circumstance whatsoever
that justifies human rights violations.183 While members of courts nationwide used to be nervous
to make a decision holding corporations liable to customary international law violations,
especially those related to human rights violations, the trend is shifting away.184 “The fact that
international human rights arguments . . . [can cause] political discourse is not a reason to shy
away from their use.”185
IV.

CONCLUSION
“Too many workers stand before their [corporate] employers, not as adult persons with

rights, but as powerless . . . servants totally dependent on the will and interests of the
employers.”186 Corporations incorporated in the United States are able to escape liability for
customary international law violations committed against workers abroad. Prior to February
2020, corporations in Canada also escaped such liability. This changed when the Supreme Court
181
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of Canada deemed that customary international law demands that the state hold corporations
liable for international law violations of human rights.187
Various sources, including treaties, reports, and academia, confirm that customary
international law supports holding corporations liable for tortious acts committed outside the
state.188 Holding corporations liable for such acts is not a drastic jump because they are held
liable for similar criminal acts.189 Neither the United States nor Canada need legislative or
executive intervention to hold corporations liable because the law of nations is a part of the
common law.190 Thus, so long as no conflicting legislation exists, the judiciary has discretion to
grant plaintiffs the opportunity to seek justice and ultimately be recognized as a human.191
Opponents stress that judicial action will cause foreign relation issues192 and that the Court is not
able to evaluate economic and policy issues that can be affected by such a decision.193 However,
basic human rights are recognized as jus cogens norms and thus they cannot be legally
ignored.194 In fact, recognizing human rights helps relations among states.195
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The Supreme Court of Canada was not far-reaching in its opinion as some claim; it was a

fair, legal, and representative take on modern international human rights law. As Justice Abella
perfectly highlighted, the case is “the application of modern international human rights law, the
phoenix that rose from the ashes of World War II and declared global war on human rights
abuses.”196 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court should follow Canada’s precedent in
finding that customary international law imposes liability on corporations for international law
violations of human rights.
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